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Abstract 
This study examines the transfer of a Brazilian MNC’s HR model to its subsidiaries in the 
UK, Canada, Switzerland and Norway. It explores where the model was sourced from, to 
what extent it bore a distinct Brazilian complexion, and whether it was adapted to meet the 
strictures of host institutional constraints and traditions. The paper uses these questions to 
address an important theoretical debate in the international business literature; that is, whether 
the pattern of diffusion of management practices within MNCs will lead to a convergence of 
practices across companies and countries à la the convergence perspective, or whether this is 
unlikely given the variety of social and political constraints limiting such a process as 
suggested by the contingency perspective. We find that the MNC imposed a unitary (US-
sourced) model of HR ‘best practice’ on all of its subsidiaries. Thus our empirical findings 
support the convergence thesis. However, we argue that these outcomes are largely explained 
by relations of power and economic dependence; specifically the co-existence of dominant-
country (US) practices and a dominant sectoral firm operating in economically dependent 
regions. Where similar circumstances are replicated one might foresee convergence within 
sectors across countries, but otherwise pluralism and eclecticism between sectors and across 
countries might be the predominant pattern along the lines envisaged in the conceptualization 
of “converging divergences”. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we address the question of how does a MNC from an emerging economy, Brazil, 
identify and transfer its HRM practices to its subsidiaries. We address this important question 
by examining the case of a very significant Brazilian MNC with operations in four mature 
western economies (Switzerland, Norway, UK and Canada) whose labor and employment 
systems vary greatly. We draw on two theoretical frameworks – the convergence and 
contingency perspectives – to account for whether and by what means and with effects the 
case MNC sought to diffuse its global HR model.  
We use the case of a MNC from Brazil to address a series of specific questions. These 
are: to what extent did the case MNC from an emerging country draw on its parent-country’s 
national business system to develop its preferred HR practices? We were particularly curious 
to know whether, in the absence of a rich repository of indigenous managerial expertise, 
management was compelled to look beyond its national boundaries for know-how and 
guidance. If this was the case, how and where did the MNC source such expertise? Did it, for 
example, rely on international consultants? Assuming they did, to what extent did the ‘best 
practices’ proffered displace home-country influences such that there remained little by way 
of its HR practices retaining a ‘national pedigree’? If this was the case, might we then suggest 
that MNCs from emerging countries have the potential to become a conduit for the diffusion 
of ‘international best practices’ and therewith the convergence of managerial practices across 
nation states? These are important questions, but remain to date relatively under-explored in 
the international literature. There is, we concede some research on these issues, but much of it 
is derived from survey research (Harzing and Sorge, 2003), which, while useful in mapping 
the extent and nature of diffusion of management practices, tells us little about the processes 
and dynamics of the sharing and transfer of ‘best practice’. 
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In our study we learn that the MNC did indeed source its HR practices from outside 
Brazil, relying primarily on American consultancy firms. Yet we also find that the 
institutional context from which the MNC emerged had a clear and discernible effect on its 
management style and, in turn, on the manner in which its HR ‘best practices’ were diffused 
and implemented in its foreign subsidiaries. This raises a rather obvious distinction, then, 
between ‘management style’ and ‘best practice’. We use the latter term to refer to the 
particular HR policies introduced by corporate management, and it is distinguished here from 
the manner of their introduction (management style). Thus we make no claim that the 
introduction of ‘best practice’ is or ought to be accompanied by information-sharing, 
consultation and negotiation as might be prescribed by ‘good management’. We deliberately 
eschew any such judgment. Indeed we find that the MNC’s US-sourced HR policies were 
transferred by means of a distinct Brazilian style of management that was assertive and, for 
the main part, unyielding. We thus identify a unique amalgam of practices and style of 
management which bore a similar hue in each of the four case countries and which critically 
came to override host country institutional impediments and constraints. Therefore, there was 
a considerable convergence of practice across the four case subsidiaries.  
We explain this convergence of practices by a variety of factors, including corporate 
management motivation to adopt ‘international best practice’, the MNC’s ethnocentrism that 
permitted very limited autonomy to local subsidiary management, and the porosity of the host 
institutional regimes in a context of economic dependence and immense corporate power.  We 
give particular emphasis to the latter factor and argue that outcomes were ultimately 
contingent on the institutional and socio-political context of the MNC and its subsidiaries. In 
interpreting the wider significance of our findings, we remain critical of reductionist claims in 
the literature which point either towards increasing convergence of management practices 
within MNCs and across sectors à la the convergence thesis or the resilience of diversity as 
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found in the contingency perspective. We argue the reality is more complex; there is evidence 
of both. Still, lines of differentiation can be identified. We suggest that the likely future 
pattern is one of discernible patterns of convergence both within MNCs and within sectors 
across countries, together with the likelihood of divergence across MNCs and sectors within 
countries. 
2. Literature Review 
The convergence thesis is built upon a number of suppositions. First, there is the assumption 
that there is an identifiable set of practices which are considered optimal or the ‘best’ at any 
given time (Kostova and Roth, 2002). ‘Best practice’ is deemed to be ‘best’ by its association 
with leading firms from hegemonic or dominant national business systems, such as US-based 
MNCs (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Kipping and Wright, 2012). The transmission or 
emulation of ‘best practice’ is particularly likely to occur in MNCs which originate in ‘lesser’ 
or subordinate national business systems where specialized managerial competencies are 
lacking (Elger and Smith, 2006; Kuruvilla et al., 2003; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). Such 
replication is derived, too, from the leading position of American business schools and 
consultancy firms and their respective roles in the training of managers and in the 
dissemination of management expertise (Kipping and Wright, 2012). The process of diffusion 
is also helped by the sheer number of American MNCs with subsidiaries in other countries 
(Pudelko and Harzing, 2008). Emulation is thus seen to arise as a consequence of both 
mimetic and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Closely associated with the notion of ‘best practice’ and the convergence thesis is the 
concept of dominance effects. Such effects have been found to be particularly evident at a 
sectoral level. Here the practices of a ‘leading’ or ‘strong’ MNC are identified as exercising a 
pattern-making role within a given sector. For example, Royle (2004; 2006) found evidence 
of such dominance and convergence within the fast food-service sector in Italy, Germany and 
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Spain. As McDonalds came to undermine significant elements of its host countries’ industrial 
relations systems by imposing its ‘one best way’, in turn its alien practices were soon 
mimicked by indigenously-owned fast food retailers. By such means, McDonalds was 
identified as a vector not only for the emasculation of countries’ industrial relations systems, 
but also for the cross-national convergence of employment practices within its sector. In such 
circumstances, ‘best practice’ assumes a particular sectoral configuration such that we come 
to witness a convergence of practices around a shared sense of what is ‘best’ within sectors, 
but otherwise a divergence of practices may prevail across sectors; a process, to borrow the 
term of Katz and Darbishire (2000), of one entailing “converging divergences”.  
The advantage for management of using such ‘best practices’ is that not only are they 
deemed to be ‘the best’ in the sense they are acclaimed to work, but they also reduce 
organizational complexity (Christmann, 2004), time and effort in experimenting with a variety 
of practices (Edwards and Ferner, 2002), help in the establishment of a common corporate 
culture, as well as serving as an aid with the global integration of business operations and the 
delivery or provision of standardized products and services across different countries 
(Edwards et al., 2007; Ferner et al., 2005). In essence, they enhance managerial control, and 
the logic of best practice is used to enjoin subsidiaries’ workforces to accept the logic of their 
implementation (Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). 
As MNCs from emerging markets internationalize into developed economies one might 
expect them to engage in what Edwards (1998) has termed ‘reverse diffusion’. In this 
situation, headquarters management identify ‘best practice’ in their subsidiaries and transfer it 
back to be adopted within their home country firms and then transferred onward (‘forward 
diffusion’) again to their other foreign facilities. Such a view links with the ‘resource-based’ 
view of the firm wherein MNCs are seen to extract international competitive advantage from 
sourcing distinctive resources from across their subsidiaries (Taylor et al., 1996). The origin 
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of ‘best practice’ may then be multiple and variable and may stem from any number of 
distinctive characteristics of host business systems. However, the resulting convergence on a 
particular amalgam of ‘best practices’ is shaped by management’s rational choices that are in 
turn shaped by the economic context of the firm (Oliver, 1991). There is certainly evidence 
that such an activity is a strategic priority among emerging countries’ MNCs (Zhang and 
Edwards, 2007).  
The assumption that MNCs will want to standardize their HR practices across their 
subsidiaries and this would lead to convergence in HR practices internationally has been 
subject to much criticism (Gerhart, 2005). An alternative perspective, which we label the 
contingency perspective, gives emphasis to a variety of factors which might constrain such a 
process. Among the most significant is the influence of local institutional constraints and the 
extent to which they are marshalled by local actors in limiting the preferences of MNCs’ 
management. Outcomes are thus seen to be uncertain, and contingent on the nature and shape 
of power relations within the MNC (Ferner et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 1996). With this 
perspective HR practices are seen to be deeply wedded to particular institutional structures, 
legacies and cultural preferences, and are difficult to alter, at least in the short term (Farndale 
and Paauwe, 2007; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). Thus where practices are ‘localized’; that is, 
adapted to suit the local context and to marry with local traditions and norms, emphasis is 
given to the possibility of divergence in practices across the units of a MNC (Björkman and 
Budhwar, 2007; Chung et al., 2014).  
The tension between host and home country institutional influences is widely 
recognized in the international literature to be most acutely felt by those MNCs whose home 
country practices diverge significantly from practice and traditions of the host economy 
(Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005; Tempel et al., 2006). Kostova refers to this as ‘institutional 
distance’ (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Such potential for conflict may require a 
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MNC’s headquarters to consider giving local management discretion as to how to best 
configure the host country’s subsidiaries’ practices (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005; Ferner et 
al., 2001). Where this occurs, the quest for external legitimacy (or local responsiveness) in the 
host country is often said to triumph over management’s quest for internal consistency (or 
global integration) within the MNC (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). The greater the institutional 
“distance” between the host country and the MNC’s home country the less likely, it is argued, 
that common ‘best practice’ will be diffused successfully (Colakoglu and Caligiuri, 2008; 
Harzing and Sorge, 2003; Taylor et al., 1996). One study, for example, of four industries in 
India and two in Malaysia found that local actors such as government, unions, and 
management were able to erect obstacles to the diffusion of ‘best practice’ of MNCs from 
dominant economies. Accordingly, the authors argued that ‘best practices’ are not equivalent 
to universalistic MNC practices (Kuruvilla et al., 2003: 191). It might thus be anticipated that 
an emerging country’s MNC’s ability to transfer common HR practices will vary depending 
on the institutional profile of the host countries in which it operates and in turn on their 
institutionally distance from the MNC’s parent country.  
Other constraints also matter, including particularly, the resources available to 
headquarters management to identify and implement its policies and practices (Taylor et al., 
1996); the perceived necessity or desire to diffuse standardized practices, which is likely to 
vary depending on the level of corporate or production integration (Edwards and Rees, 2006); 
a subsidiary’s dependence on its headquarters (Farndale et al., 2010) and vice versa; the 
subsidiary’s strategic role and influence within the MNC (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008) 
together with the subsidiaries’ management knowledge of local markets, local institutional 
constraints, and the size and performance of the subsidiary (Ferner et al., 2011; Schuler and 
Rogocsky, 1998). 
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Fundamentally, then, while the contingency perspective recognizes that the 
headquarters possesses vast resources and the authority to render legitimate its preferred 
policies, the transfer process is uncertain and contingent; that is, it is not solely determined by 
the rational prescriptions of corporate management, but is rather shaped by “the interplay of 
interests and the possession and deployment of power resources by a variety of actors” 
(Ferner and Tempel, 2006: 31).  
3. The Brazilian institutional context 
While it has become common practice to classify national business systems as being either 
liberal or co-ordinated on the basis of the co-ordinating capacity or restraining influence of 
their business and labour market institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001), any such easy 
classification has limited resonance for an emerging economy such as Brazil. We rely instead 
on Schneider’s (2009) analysis of the distinctive institutional foundations of business systems 
in Latin America which he identifies as constituting hierarchical market economies (HMEs) 
and into which Brazil fits well. HMEs are characterised by the dominance of diversified 
business groups; the significant presence of MNCs, especially of US origin; a dearth of 
investment in education, training and skill development; weak (workplace) trade unions and 
large informal labor markets. Overlapping each of these elements is the pervasive presence of 
hierarchical relations where employers determine – often unilaterally – patterns of work 
organisation and the nature and extent of job training; further, grievance and employee voice 
mechanisms are weak or absent. The presence of highly centralized and hierarchical styles of 
management is seen to be rooted in two influences: first, in a long tradition of state 
intervention in labor markets that had the effect of dissuading employers from conducting 
bilateral negotiations with unions and instead inclined them to pursue their interests directly 
with the state; and second in the predominance of a small number of large companies – many 
in family ownership and mainly MNCs – that dominate their given sectors. In the specific 
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instance of Brazil, the State has played a key role in sponsoring the development of industrial 
companies in key economic sectors, including natural resources (Diniz, 1997; Leal et al., 
2002). 
Brazilian scholars trace the origins of Brazil’s authoritarian style of management to the 
country’s historical legacy of slavery, colonialism, the early formation of an elite class, the 
persistence of a highly class structured society, and the rise of “bureaucratic authoritarianism” 
during periods of military rule (Carvalho Neto, 2003; Ribeiro, 1995). This style of 
management relies on informal institutions and personal relationships (Ribeiro, 1995) rather 
than on formal institutions as observed in mature economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
However, it would be unnecessarily crude to portray Brazilian employers as being ‘cultural 
dopes’. Local scholars now acknowledge that traditional styles of management have been 
tempered in recent years, especially in large well-resourced Brazilian companies which 
possess the means to import ‘best practice’ – mainly from the United States – either by 
recruiting from leading business schools or by availing of the expertise of US-based 
management consultancy firms (Chu and Wood, 2008; Fleury and Fleury, 2006; Tanure et al., 
2010). 
The management of headquarters-subsidiary relations within Brazilian MNCs is 
characterized in the literature as being highly integrated with subsidiaries possessing limited 
local autonomy and particularly in respect of human resources management policy (Muritiba 
et al., 2012). The transfer of personnel from head office to subsidiaries, particularly during the 
early stages of MNCs’ expansion, is a common practice. While Brazilian MNCs rate human 
resources management as an important competence in pursuing international expansion 
(Fleury & Fleury, 2006), few have been identified as dedicating sufficient resources to 
developing a global human resources management competency (Muritiba et al., 2012), or in 
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providing sufficient training for expatriate management to cope with, or to be sensitive to, the 
requirements of cross-cultural management (Tanure et al., 2009). 
4. The host countries’ institutional contexts   
In order to understand how the institutional environments of mature market economies might 
constrain or resource MNCs in the transfer of their HR policies, we distinguish between 
varieties of labor market regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Switzerland and Norway were 
chosen as examples of ‘co-ordinated market economies’, and Canada and the United 
Kingdom as ‘liberal market economies’. Switzerland is a ‘soft’ or ‘liberal’ variant of a co-
ordinated market economy (Börsch, 2008). Trade unions are relatively weak and the state’s 
regulatory capacity is more limited than that of other European countries arising from the 
country’s canton structure. Labor law is restrained in its reach and most aspects of 
employment regulation are governed by collective agreements. Norway’s institutional 
environment is highly coordinated and regulated. Its trade unions are strong and there is 
considerable government intervention in the field of employment relations (Dølvik and 
Stokke, 1998; Dølvik, 2007). Further, the Labor Party’s traditional hegemony has played a 
key role in shaping power relations between employers and unions and has encouraged co-
operation between them (Dølvik and Stokke, 1998). The labor market is characterized by 
strict employment protection, and it is politically difficult for the government to unilaterally 
institute structural reforms in the labor market (Neal, 2007), allowing trade unions to exert 
some considerable influence on the management of companies (Gooderham et al., 1999). 
In Canada labor markets are relatively deregulated. Relations between employers and 
unions have traditionally been portrayed as being adversarial or arm’s-length with unions 
earnestly defending their right to bargain for their members’ terms and conditions of 
employment with employers striving to protect their right to manage and implement 
organizational changes as they might deem appropriate (Godard, 2009). Although union 
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density has held up relatively well in recent years (30%), it has declined more noticeably in 
some sectors, including mining (22%) (Galarneau and Sohn, 2013). The United Kingdom is 
characterized as a liberal state with deregulated labor and capital markets with low levels of 
state intervention and business co-ordination (Howell, 2007). Both the United Kingdom and 
Canada are also regarded in the literature as being particularly open to the importation of 
novel human resources management practices, which is attributed to their long history of 
hosting MNCs, particularly from the United States (see Ferner et al., 2013). 
5. The case company and its subsidiaries 
The case company, here called BrazilCo, is a very large and significant Brazilian MNC. It has 
more than 140,000 workers at home and overseas and is extremely profitable. In 2009 its 
market value was US$150 billion; its net income was around US$30 billion from 2010 to 
2013. It had sales of around US$90 billion in this period. With operations in almost 40 
countries, it is possible for the company to source production from other facilities. BrazilCo 
was state-owned until 1997. Since then it grew significantly through foreign acquisitions. Its 
headquarters remain in Brazil as are over 60 per cent of its assets and 80 per cent of its 
workforce. Its board of directors is composed mainly of Brazilian nationals. It is a dominant 
player in a number of sector segments in which it operates.  
BrazilCo’s Canadian and UK operations were acquired in 2006 through the acquisition 
of a Canadian-owned mining and refining MNC, which we label CanadaCo. It had over 5,000 
workers employed in four mining and refining plants and in one regional office. While 
Canada accounted for 47 per cent of CanadaCo’s revenues pre-acquisition, post-acquisition it 
represented a mere 4 per cent of BrazilCo’s revenues. Union density at BrazilCo’s Canadian 
operations was 70 per cent and union representatives exercised considerable influence over 
management decision-making in respect of work organization, reward systems and pay levels. 
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The BrazilCo’s British refinery employed 260 workers, and while over half of its workers 
were union members, the union exercised little, if any, influence over management.  
BrazilCo entered Norway through acquiring a former state-owned facility that had been 
closed for a number of years. The Norwegian refinery, which was located in the north of the 
country, employed 78 workers, most of whom were re-recruited from the staff of the former 
company. Union density was very high (90 per cent). It was of modest strategic significance 
to BrazilCo since it accounted for a mere 1 per cent of the MNC’s overall revenues. The 
Swiss subsidiary was established in 2006 as a regional office hub. It was responsible for tax, 
risk assessment, marketing and sales, budgeting and production, as well as the implementation 
of policies and practices emanating from the Brazilian headquarters in the company’s 
European and Middle Eastern operations. It employed 89 workers, only 15 of whom were 
Swiss. There was no trade union or works council present in the facility. 
Three of the four countries’ subsidiaries were located in peripheral areas. The local 
communities were very reliant on the company’s investment and employment. This 
dependence was greater in Canada. In two localities, BrazilCo employed almost 65 per cent of 
the local workforce. Local unemployment was also high. In Canada it varied between 7 and 
11 per cent, and in the UK and Norway it was 8 and 7 per cent respectively. Unemployment 
levels were, by comparison, considerably lower in Switzerland. 
6. Research Methodology 
The data were derived from in-depth semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1). 
Preliminary interviews were conducted in July 2009 with two HR global managers in the 
company’s corporate headquarters in Brazil. Between July 2009 and February 2011 a further 
49 interviews were undertaken, mainly among senior management. Of these, 16 were 
conducted in Brazil, 8 in Switzerland, 12 in Canada, 8 in Norway, and 7 in the UK. These 
were supplemented by e-mail communications, usually to seek clarification on matters raised 
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during the interviews. After conducting a preliminary analysis of the data, additional 
telephone interviews were conducted with two corporate human resource managers in Brazil 
in January 2013. These interviews were conducted for a number of purposes: to ‘road-test’ 
our first conclusions, to fill gaps in the data collection, and to derive an update on 
developments in the transfer of practices to the four subsidiaries. Excluding these latter 
interviews and four other interviews (one each in Switzerland, Canada, UK, and Brazil) all 
were tape-recorded, giving a total of over thirty-six hours recording. All were transcribed by 
one of the authors. Interviews were conducted in Portuguese with Brazilian staff and in 
English with non-Brazilian interviewees. In the case of the Swiss and Canadian subsidiaries, 
expatriate managers were also interviewed. In Brazil, the former corporate HR Director was 
interviewed in an effort to confirm the testimonies given by current executives. Trade union 
and staff representatives were interviewed in Brazil (CUT, Força Sindical, and UGT), Norway 
(LO), Canada (USW), and the UK (Unite) in order to understand the role and influence these 
actors might have played in shaping local HR practices.  
Every reasonable effort was made to conduct the interviews until data saturation was 
reached (Guest et al., 2006), and verification was sought through secondary sources of data. A 
diverse range of documentary sources was used, including various books on BrazilCo’s 
history, annual reports (from 1942 to 2011), internal communications, a documentary, as well 
as articles in Veja and Folha de São Paulo from 1968 to 2012. The latter are Brazil’s leading 
and most respected magazine and newspaper titles. In Switzerland, we reviewed articles in 
various press media (Le Temps and Tribune de Genève) from 1998 to 2012 that referred to our 
case company. In Norway we reviewed LO, NHO and government documentation. In Canada 
we examined articles from the Toronto Star and The Sudbury Star from 1985 to 2011, and in 
the UK various collective agreements and articles from the Western Mail and South Wales 
Evening Post from 1980 to 2011.  
15 
 
The data obtained from the interviews and the aforementioned secondary data sources 
were transposed into a computer file to enable a deductive content analysis. The data analysis 
was conducted in two steps. First the material was reviewed in their original languages: 
Portuguese and English. It was feared that translating the interviews and secondary data into 
only one of those languages – at least at an early point in the research – could lead to 
misunderstandings (Xian, 2008). No computer-aided software was used. Instead, a qualitative 
form of content analysis was conducted (Krippendorff, 2004), in which the sentence was the 
basic unit of analysis related by key words grouped as categories to produce a ‘cluster’. After 
a first categorization the key materials were translated into English through the following 
procedure: they were translated by one author who speaks Portuguese and English and 
proofread by an English native speaker. Then, they were given to the Brazilian researcher for 
a back translation (Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997). When the original and the back 
translation diverged, a discussion to resolve any anomalies was conducted with the English 
and Portuguese native speakers.  
Three aggregate dimensions were identified: country-of-origin, BrazilCo in the host 
country, and the implementation of HR ‘best practice’. In order to confirm the internal 
consistency of the data analysis and the reliability of the identified categories, the files were 
coded twice by the same researcher, a process which Krippendorff (2004) has termed 
‘stability reliability’. No significant differences were found with each categorization.  
The study’s preliminary findings were returned to the company for ‘member-checking’ 
in two phases. First, they were reviewed with the global HRM director in a face-to-face 
interview, over the phone with the Swiss and Canadian HRM managers, and subsequently in 
January 2013 (as indicated above) with corporate HR management. Then, a draft report was 
sent to management in Brazil, Switzerland, Norway, Canada and the UK for factual 
verification.  
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7. Findings 
We begin first by detailing the MNC’s management structure and principal aspects of its 
global HR model. We then turn to consider their implementation, and, in particular, the 
manner in which they were received by the subsidiaries’ workforces. 
Management structures. BrazilCo’s managerial structure was composed of seven levels, 
the most senior of which (L7) was the CEO. Strategic decisions were taken by the CEO and 
five executive (L6) officers all of whom were Brazilian nationals. All L7- and L6-managers 
were based in the Brazilian HQ as were most of the L5 and L4 positions. Decision-making 
within the company was highly centralized and was portrayed as being “autocratic”. This was 
thought by most senior managers interviewed as being ‘normal’ for a Brazilian company: 
“BrazilCo is fundamentally cariocentrica1. It is there in that building [HQ] where people act 
as if they were at the center of the world” (Middle Brazilian manager). 
The transfer of HR practices. The centralization of management decision-making was 
also accompanied by the importation of US-sourced ‘best practice’. These new HR policies 
were developed in association with American consultancy firms, including Accenture, 
McKinsey, Boston Consultant Group (BCG), Booz Allen, Ernest & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “We use consultancies. There is a technical analysis behind it (the 
practice). There are several well-known international consultancies which globally assist us. 
They search the market for what we need to do”. (Middle Brazilian manager).  
Such was the extent of American consultancies’ firms involvement in BrazilCo that they 
were frequently observed “as being part” of the company’s structure. Virtually all 
departments worked with external consultants in the development and implementation of 
different projects. Some managers complained of having to deal with consultants over long 
periods of time. “Sometimes I think, ‘please get them out of here’”, one manager protested. 
                                                          
1
 As a reference to carioca - people who were born and live in Rio de Janeiro. 
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There was a pervading sense that they were merely doing what they were being told to do by 
the consultants: “When you import the American mainstream you are standardizing your 
company to that (imported) tradition… it is something like a cookie cutter (Middle Brazilian 
manager). 
In the human resources department, a large variety of projects were undertaken by 
Accenture and Boston Consultant Group. The latter, for example, implemented the staff 
career and development program, and worked in redesigning jobs. It was also in charge of 
producing training workshops for Brazilian managers. Accenture dealt with the development 
and implementation of learning management programs in Brazil and overseas. Again with the 
consultancy firms’ help, Brazilian management worked to bring together their various HR 
policies to develop a so-called “global HR model”, which was then cascaded down to each 
individual subsidiary via the regional divisions. Ultimately, the American consultancy firms 
introduced practices that were developed in the United States and were referred to as 
“American best practice”. Local subsidiaries were then expected to implement these practices, 
which became known as the company’s human resources “DNA” or “global model”. The 
global model comprised performance evaluation, leadership training, career and succession 
planning and pay-for-performance. The implementation of the MNC’s global model was 
intended to permit BrazilCo to standardize its procedures and policies across the MNC:  
The key point [in the implementation of the global model] was to identify the 
‘lowest common denominator’ of a policy and not to give in under any 
circumstance (Brazilian former director). 
[... HR policies and practices] they are not changing for any country. It is 
something like … if you are in this school you have to wear its uniform, 
whether you like it or not; or you change your school (Brazilian director). 
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It is about standardizing. The argument is, if you standardize, you remove 
inefficiencies and you have a predictable outcome. I don’t believe the 
organization likes unpredictability. If you put in enough management processes 
and you believe in the management processes, as opposed to the people 
activity, you can lead yourself to say ‘well I have all the systems in place, 
people just need to follow them’ (Senior Canadian manager). 
 
In the four subsidiaries, while most local managers stated that they were familiar with 
many of the new practices which the company wanted to introduce and most saw value in 
their introduction, they queried the manner in which they were transferred by Brazilian 
management. There was, as the quotations above illustrate, little room for local management 
to discuss or alter the implementation process. 
Management development. The company’s global human resources model gave 
particular focus to the role performed by line managers. For each of the seven management 
levels there were specific ritos de passagem (‘rites of passage’). Employees in the first and 
second levels, which were respectively analyst and supervisor positions, undertook a week’s 
training in respect of “what it means to be a BrazilCo leader”. Staff at the third level took a 
one-week course at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which taught participants of 
the complexities involved in managing people and, in particular, across different national 
cultures. L4 and higher level managers were provided with a one-week leadership course at 
the International Institute for Management Development in Switzerland. The company also 
had a global career and succession policy which facilitated global internal recruitment and 
promotion.  
Reward management. BrazilCo saw itself as a “meritocracy”, rewarding and promoting 
employees who demonstrated superior performance. Its pay-for-performance system which 
applied to all its subsidiaries was based on three different elements: company (25 per cent), 
department (25 per cent), and individual (50 per cent) performance. However, the proportion 
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of employees’ remuneration which was comprised of pay-for-performance was permitted to 
vary between countries depending on local practice and traditions. That being said, each 
subsidiary was expected to adopt an “aggressive”:  
“BrazilCo has this aggressive attitude regarding pay-for-performance. It is 
more aggressive than that which is usually found in the market place. 
Sometimes it is not well accepted in other cultures, but we still implement it” 
(Middle Brazilian manager). 
7.1 The transfer of ‘best practice’ to BrazilCo’ subsidiaries 
7.1.1 Canada 
Upon acquiring CanadaCo, BrazilCo moved all of its former HQ functions from Toronto to 
Rio de Janeiro. It then transferred its global HR model which was perceived locally as “thou 
shalt”; that is, while local management saw nothing necessarily “wrong” with the policies, 
they queried whether they would be better than the existing local practices and the unilateral 
manner in which they were implemented. 
The Canadian managers also confirmed that BrazilCo made extensive use of US-based 
consultancy firms and that the policies had been ‘benchmarked’ against leading international 
companies. One senior manager showed one of the researchers a bunch of cards where each 
card represented a company and its policies that had been benchmarked by BrazilCo’s 
consultants. It became clear then that BrazilCo not only benchmarked its practices against 
those of American MNCs, but it did also against other leading international companies, 
irrespective of their nationality (although American MNCs predominated). Interviewees 
confirmed that the HR policies had not been developed by Canadians: “I have been told no 
policies would come from here (Canada); policies would come from (HQ) and are to be 
implemented here” (Middle Canadian manager). Their introduction and implementation gave 
rise to tensions and difficulties among staff, but the prevailing view among management was 
that it was best to accept these policies. 
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I see my Canadian subordinates are upset about it. I have moved on, I have just 
accepted that they are different and it is not personal, it is not anti-Canadian, it 
is not anti-Brazilian. It is actually part of the game we were employed to play; 
stand back, reconcile what your own personal differences may well be and 
move along because we have a lot of work to do (Senior Canadian manager).  
To illustrate the problems that arose, the Canadian managers gave special emphasis to 
the manner in which the pay-for-performance policy was introduced. They claimed they were 
unsure and uncertain as to how it would work in practice, and despite requesting that they be 
given the time to discuss and debate its merits, they had no influence over its implementation. 
This created feelings of distrust among the managers. One Canadian manager commented: 
Where the gap exists is in the implementation and execution. They try to copy 
international ‘best practice’, but the implementation is different. They know 
how to implement in Brazil. Now, how to implement things in a different 
cultural setting is a challenge. It has been an absolute disaster in North-
America. (Senior Canadian Manager). 
The introduction of new payment and pension policies for manual workers in the mines 
and refineries involved respectively changes to the existing bonus scheme, which had been 
linked to the market price for nickel and a shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-
contribution pension plan. Under CanadaCo’s ownership, the nickel price bonus was triggered 
when the price of nickel reached US$2 per pound; there was no cap. BrazilCo wished to 
reform this plan and introduce a new pay-for-performance scheme. This was to allow for 70 
per cent of workers’ annual earnings to be fixed and the remaining 30 per cent to be 
determined by performance (24%) and the price of nickel (6%).  
In July 2009, following attempts by management to negotiate a new collective 
agreement, the miners rejected the proposal. The workers objected that the new payment and 
pension policies would result in a significant reduction in their earnings and retirement 
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benefits. They further claimed that management would not be able to fairly evaluate 
employees’ performance levels. In objection the workers voted for strike action. The 
subsequent strike, which lasted for up to 18 months, became the longest-lasting private sector 
strike in Canada for more than 30 years. When the workers eventually abandoned their action, 
BrazilCo proceeded to introduce the new policies as originally planned, although they made a 
slight adjustment to the pay scheme by increasing the nickel price bonus component from 6 
per cent to 8 per cent and reducing the pay-for-performance component from 24 per cent to 22 
per cent. Senior management justified the new policies on the basis that they were now 
“company’s global policy”, and they had been already implemented in other subsidiaries.  
We are trying to make sure we have uniform policies across the organization. 
BrazilCo is a very fair, very successful international company; so, we can’t 
make an exception in Canada just because these guys feel that they have been 
on this pension plan for so many years that nothing ever changes (Senior 
Canadian manager). 
By contrast, the programs for management training were well-received by local 
management. They particularly appreciated the career and succession planning program and 
the manner in which feedback and talent mapping was produced, as well as the way these 
initiatives afforded them opportunities for advancement, which they saw as having been 
considerably more limited in CanadaCo. The Canadian subsidiaries implemented all the 
associated policies according to the requirements of BrazilCo’s global model.  
7.1.2 The UK 
Under CanadaCo’s management, the British subsidiary had enjoyed considerable autonomy to 
decide its own HR policies and practices. Post-acquisition the Brazilian management 
extended their “command and control style of management” to the UK. As in Canada, British 
managers observed both the shift in the locus of power and the influence of consultancy firms: 
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“BrazilCo is run by consultancy firms” (Middle British manager). “They (Brazilian 
management) want to control everything. I think we all get used to this business of do it by 
yesterday…and that is a Brazilian influence for sure; that is control and command (Senior 
British manager).  
In order to ensure that the necessary systems and procedures were put in place, the HQ 
put an implementation team in place that was described to us as a team which “pushed from 
behind”. In turn the Brazilian managers were portrayed as having a “project to implement”. 
“They will do it, no matter what. You can’t say no”, explained a senior UK manager. 
Although local management conceded that some very good policies were introduced and that 
their standardization was important so that corporate management would have a better 
understanding of each subsidiary’s performance, their implementation was perceived to be 
problematic. As in Canada, there was little, if any, room for discussion or consultation:  
They just have this plan and you will do it and, if you don’t do it, they’ll get 
somebody else to do it (Middle British manager).  
 
So, we find it quite frustrating if we are told, “don’t want to talk about it, just 
do it”, and so that for us, culturally, it’s quite disrespectful and that is how it is 
perceived with a number of these major projects. We don’t have much 
opportunity to input into them (Middle British manager).  
Many, too, felt that the role of external consultants had become over-bearing. One 
interviewee said, “I would say there are too many consultants. (HQ should) let the managers 
manage it”. The company’s career and succession program was implemented along with a 
similar performance evaluation system. The new pay-for-performance policy and defined-
contribution pension plan was also introduced, but in contrast to Canada, there was no 
resistance to their implementation in the UK. The former was perceived by British employees 
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as a significant windfall that was not enjoyed by employees in other companies in the locality. 
They also saw themselves as being comparatively well paid.  
There aren’t a lot of other heavy industries in this area. So if you are 
comparing your income with other people that work in the local shops and the 
public sector... Do you think people working in the public sector get 25 per 
cent bonuses?  People see they are better off than people who do not get any 
bonus (Senior British manager).  
 
The circumstances of the local labor market and employees’ relatively good earnings 
were thus a key influence in shaping their response to the new policies. Managers were also 
comfortable with the pay-for-performance policy, indicating that the goals that an employee 
must achieve in order to receive the full bonus helped them to improve the organization’s 
productivity, principally by reducing employee absenteeism (there was a sickness penalty tied 
into the bonus payment policy). 
7.1.3 Switzerland 
BrazilCo’s global HR model was also transferred to Switzerland and local management 
confirmed that the company made extensive use of international consultants. They also 
reported that they enjoyed little autonomy and felt compelled to adhere to the policies and 
practices as delineated by HQ management. The Swiss managers observed that ordinarily they 
would have expected to have been able to query, or perhaps challenge corporate management 
proposals or decision-making, but in BrazilCo this was difficult. Nonetheless, many of the 
‘best practice’ methods which were introduced were well-known to the Swiss managers and 
were welcomed with the exception of pay-for-performance. That apart, they did not see any 
problem – in theory – in adopting the global model and its associated ‘best practice’. 
However, their concerns were in regard to the manner in which the Brazilian management 
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sought to ape international practices without considering why other companies choose these 
particular practices or indeed whether and how they might be implemented in other countries.  
I think Brazilian companies in general see things which other people are doing 
and adopt them, saying ‘OK, we will do the same because they are doing it’ but 
without doing any sort of research behind it on why they chose that way or 
how it is going to be implemented, or, you know, is this the best thing for us? 
(Senior Swiss manager). 
Another senior manager objected: “It is not the system itself, it is the way they asked 
us to do it”. Swiss managers suggested that it would have been better had BrazilCo focused 
on the process of introducing policies, and invited local input in a way which would 
engage local managers. This, they argued, would have helped in the implementation 
process: “They just sent it out to everyone and said ‘here you go’” (Middle Swiss 
manager). “I do not think we have been able to make a real difference or have a real 
influence, or real sharing here” (Middle Swiss manager). 
Of the policies introduced, the Swiss managers particularly welcomed the provision 
of leadership and management training, and especially the opportunity to attend courses at 
IMD and MIT, together with the career and succession planning program. The latter was 
seen to be particularly important in retaining key staff in a tight local labor market where 
alternative job opportunities abounded.  
The introduction of pay-for-performance, however, was a different matter. There was 
little or no consultation on the principle of its introduction, although local management did 
prevail on their Brazilian superiors to reduce the variable component from almost half of 
management’s salary to 21 per cent. The justification was that too high a variable 
component would have made it too difficult to recruit Swiss employees. But even with this 
reduced variable component management still complained that it was too large when 
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compared with the practice of other large companies: “In this market, it is too high, too 
much of an uncertainty. The Swiss prefer to be sure what they are getting” (Middle Swiss 
Manager). Nonetheless, the employees felt they had little option but to accept the imported 
pay practices. They observed that BrazilCo had been enticed to come to Switzerland by the 
availability of various industrial development incentives, including tax concessions. 
Interviewees observed that the Swiss subsidiary could appropriately be described as a “post 
box” and that its activities could be transferred to another country with considerable ease. 
7.1.4 Norway 
BrazilCo’s global HR model was also transferred to its Norwegian subsidiary. The Norwegian 
managers acknowledged that the policies and practices were benchmarked against ‘best 
practice’ internationally. In testimony a manager cited their discussions with PwC analysts 
who told them: “big companies do it like that”. Again the Brazilian HQ was seen to be 
insistent in introducing benchmarked policies and practices, regardless of whether they were 
perceived to suit the Norwegian context: “...but here we have the lack of adjustment. That is 
the problem. It is not the benchmarking itself, but it is the lack of adjustment” (Senior 
Norwegian manager). 
At the time we undertook our fieldwork, the Norwegian subsidiary was implementing 
the company’s career and succession plan. Local managers queried its usefulness in 
discussions with us and complained that it had not been adapted to local practices and 
traditions, but felt their concerns had not been addressed by their superiors in Rio de Janeiro. 
One senior manager said “I like the system although it is not adjusted to our needs”. Another 
concern, apart from its likely cost, related to the uncertainty surrounding how the Norwegian 
workers would interpret the policy’s operation. It was said in the interviews that Norwegian 
people do not like to receive feedback without having participated in the design of such 
policies. Local management believed the person being appraised should have the right to 
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“argue, accept, deny, and enquire. We talk to people and not about people”, said a senior 
manager.  
The implementation of the performance-related pay scheme also raised concerns. 
Previously in the Norwegian plant an incremental salary scale scheme had been in use prior to 
the facility’s closure. Provision for this was also enshrined in the industry’s collective 
agreement which obliged all companies to pay an additional percentage increase in the salary 
for every year worked by an employee. It was expected that this practice would have been 
adhered to by BrazilCo. However, because this was the custom and not a legal requirement, 
BrazilCo’s HQ refused to pay the benefit: “They said: ‘we don’t have to pay it; it is not a 
question if we want to pay, but we don’t have to pay, so we don’t pay it’” (Norwegian 
employee). 
The Brazilian managers did, however, travel to Norway in order to discuss the pay-for-
performance policy with trade union leaders, who had opposed it, as had management. “You 
have to organize your life on the assumption of a regular payment, not for this possible peak 
once a year” (Middle Norwegian manager). However, corporate management let it be known 
that the Norwegian workers would not receive any salary increase if they continued to oppose 
the introduction of pay-for-performance. At this point, the trade union re-considered its 
position: “[the employees] want to get extra money. If we don’t have the agreement, we don’t 
get anything” (Norwegian employee representative). 
The policy was introduced in 2006 and while it followed the broad procedural 
parameters as elsewhere in the MNC, the collective negotiations did lead to the variable 
component being significantly reduced. In the case of operators’ annual salary the variable 
component was reduced from 20 per cent to 8 per cent and from 50 per cent to 20 per cent in 
the case of managers’ and engineers’ salaries, and finally to 30 per cent for the site manager. 
The staff was in favor of the scheme as it was seen to insulate them from the subsidiary’s poor 
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performance and the financial losses endured immediately prior to our research. The findings 
from the four subsidiaries are summarized below in Table 1.  
Table 1. The transfer of BrazilCo’s HR policies to its subsidiaries 
HR Policy Canada UK Norway Switzerland 
Pay for performance 
Implemented albeit 
in the face of stern 
workforce resistance. 
A modest concession 
granted to workers 
Fully implemented 
with approval of 
local workforce and 
management 
Implemented but 
with some significant 
concessions in the 
face of managerial 
and workforce 
objections 
Fully implemented – 
with some small 
concessions granted 
to workers 
Performance 
evaluation 
Fully implemented – 
no concessions to 
local subsidiary  
Fully implemented – 
no concessions to 
local subsidiary  
Fully implemented – 
no concessions to 
local subsidiary  
Fully implemented – 
no concessions to 
local subsidiary  
Leadership 
Training Programs 
Welcomed and fully 
implemented   
Welcomed and fully 
implemented  
Implemented at 
higher managerial 
levels 
Welcomed and fully 
implemented  
Career and 
succession program 
Welcomed and fully 
implemented  
Welcomed and fully 
implemented  
Implemented at 
higher managerial 
levels 
Welcomed and fully 
implemented  
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study explores the transfer of a particular model of HR ‘best practice’ within a Brazilian 
MNC to four of its subsidiaries in the UK, Canada, Switzerland and Norway. Specifically it 
enquires where the MNC’s HR model was sourced from, to what extent it bore a distinct 
Brazilian complexion, and whether and to what degree it was adapted to meet the strictures of 
national institutional constraints and the expectations of staff at subsidiary level. The paper 
uses these questions to address an important theoretical debate in the international business 
and international human resource management literatures; that is, whether the pattern of 
diffusion of management practices within MNCs will lead to a convergence of practices 
across companies and countries, or whether such a scenario is highly unlikely given the 
variety of social and political constraints which might limit such a process at a local level. 
Based on our reading of the international literature, we anticipated a priori that corporate 
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management would face greater constraints in transferring its HR model to the more rigid 
systems of Norway and Switzerland than it would encounter by comparison in the more 
liberal regimes of Canada and the UK (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005; Farndale and Paauwe, 
2007; Ferner and Edwards, 1995). 
Our findings reveal that the HR practices adopted by BrazilCo were largely of 
American origin. The MNC relied to a very considerable degree on the expertise and services 
of US-based consultancy firms in designing and implementing its policies. Its ‘global HR 
model’ thus assumed a distinct American accent. However we also found that it was 
introduced with a very firm hand by Brazilian management, to the extent that headquarters’ 
management were rarely tolerant of any local questioning of its policies’ merits, or of the 
manner of their implementation. The starkest illustration of this was the company’s 
preparedness to confront and face down a bitter and protracted industrial dispute in its 
Canadian subsidiaries. The only significant exception to this unilateralist posture was 
management’s willingness to consult with the Norwegian workforce and agree to reduce the 
variable component of employees’ salary. Otherwise, however, the company global HR 
model was introduced as designed in all four subsidiaries. 
Thus the major empirical contribution of this study is its illustration of the manner in 
which a complex process (the transfer of a specific HR model informed by ‘international best 
practice’) worked itself out across particular levels of influence, including local, sectoral, 
national and international. We find that notwithstanding the American origin of these 
practices they were married to a distinctive Brazilian managerial ethos which insisted on 
management’s prerogative to manage. Thus while we argue that the practices themselves were 
not Brazilian in origin and, in this sense bore no discernible parent country hallmark, we find 
that the style of management which accompanied their transfer to be deeply rooted in Brazil’s 
national business system. The latter was hierarchical and steadfast in its unwillingness to 
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broker any resistance to its policies’ transfer. We consider this – the manner in which these 
two discrete country (US and Brazilian) effects came to be interwoven in the practice of 
international HRM in an emerging country MNC and which came to override host country 
institutional constraints – to be a significant contribution to our understanding of the processes 
by which an emerging-country MNC transferred it policies to its overseas subsidiaries.  
Thus, the striking finding of this research is the lengths to which the case MNC went to 
impose a unitary model of HR on all of its subsidiaries regardless of the countries in which 
they were located, regardless of the stage of the production process they were involved in 
(extraction, refining, administration or management), or indeed regardless of the extent to 
which local workforces sought to resist or shape the model’s imposition. This is a very 
significant finding especially when placed alongside that of MNCs from advanced economies 
that seek to ‘corporatize’ models of HR in a manner which directly challenges indigenous 
practice and custom. That BrazilCo was willing and able to contest the institutional fabric of 
its host subsidiaries is largely explained by relations of power and economic dependence. 
BrazilCo was a large and dominant player in its sector. Many of its operations were located in 
peripheral regions, in areas of relative disadvantage and high unemployment. It held 
considerable sway over local development agencies, local workforces and communities who 
came to rely on its investment. It was not that local management and workforces were devoid 
of local resources to exert influence over BrazilCo’s policies, it was rather the case that they 
found it difficult to marshal them and where they tried, corporate management possessed the 
means to overcome any local resistance. Fear of the possibility that the MNC may source raw 
materials in other cheaper locations, or move production or administrative functions from one 
subsidiary to another, weakened the power of local actors. Such contextual circumstances are 
central in accounting for the lack of localization of corporate management policies, and were 
significantly more important in explaining outcomes than the formal institutional features of 
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the local employment relations regimes of Canada, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. The 
introduction of performance-related pay and pension reforms provide the starkest illustration. 
But there apart, even where local management and workforces valued and welcomed the 
implementation of other policies, but sought to query how they might be introduced and 
adapted to suit the local context, they met with little success.  
With such findings, then, do we do better to think in terms of the convergence of 
practice as being the most significant feature of the management of HR in this emerging 
country MNC, or rather does the contingency perspective provide greater theoretical purchase 
in explaining our findings? The case for the former is significant. We find that our case MNC 
worked as a vector (Ferner et al., 2012) in disseminating ‘international best practice’ from a 
dominant economy (the US) and contributed to the convergence of managerial practices 
across its overseas subsidiaries. We further argue that the globalization of production together 
with the attendant integration of supply chains (as conceived broadly to include production 
and managerial practices) was found to enfold subsidiaries and their workforces into 
rationalities other than those prescribed by national institutions and customs. Such ‘logics’ 
facilitated the diffusion of ‘international best practice’ from a hegemonic business system (the 
US) via a dominant sectoral firm to economically dependent regions and subsidiaries. Thus, 
we claim that the importation of such ‘foreign’ models reduced the specificity of national host 
countries’ models of HR. However, we argue that such external forces account only in part for 
the outcomes witnessed in this study, for they operated in tandem with social action and 
power relations within the firm. Advantage leaned towards the MNC’s headquarters to the 
extent that the degree to which national contexts mediated and conditioned systemic or 
globalization dynamics was very limited. In such a weakened and dependent local context the 
power of the MNC to diffuse ‘international best practice’ was facilitated and hastened. 
Critically, then, the extent to which, and the manner by which, ‘international best practice’ 
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was transferred depended on the nature of the relationship between transferor and transferee; 
that is, on their relative positions in the global system of production (Smith and Meiksins 
1995). Such contingencies steer our conclusions in a different direction to that originally 
conceived and emphasize the likelihood for variations across MNCs and sectors. In this study 
the co-existence of dominant-country practices and a dominant sectoral firm strengthened the 
likelihood of the diffusion of similar practices. Such processes where they are replicated 
across MNCs and sectors can be expected to generate further convergence within sectors 
across countries, but otherwise pluralism and eclecticism between sectors and across countries 
might be the predominant pattern along the lines envisaged by Smith and Meiksins (1995) and 
by Katz and Darbishire (2000) in their conceptualization of “converging divergences”. Where 
such patterns are generalized national models of employment relations and HR can be 
expected to fragment further. 
These theoretical conclusions inevitably point to the current study’s boundaries. This is 
a study of a single MNC from one emerging economy in one specific (sunset) industry at a 
particular point in time. Its findings suggest particular conclusions, principally that pressures 
for convergence co-exist with those promoting diversity and of the requirement of future 
research to examine whether similar processes are evident elsewhere by examining the 
interaction of various effects operating across different levels – system (i.e., the characteristics 
of capitalism as a model of production), societies (i.e., countries), and hierarchy (i.e., 
dominance effects at country and sectoral levels) – as envisaged by Smith and Meiksins 
(1995) as well as others (Guillén, 2001). It does however seem likely that as MNCs from 
other emerging countries globalize and assume positions of dominance in their sectors that 
they too will seek to diffuse their particular brand of ‘best practice’. In this case study the 
specific brand of ‘best practice’ included a package of US-sourced global uniform HR 
practices that were combined with ‘Brazilian’ hierarchical centralism in a manner consistent 
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with Schneider’s (2009) conceptualization of firms originating from hierarchical market 
economies. We argue that, while this coercive hierarchical style of management is deeply 
rooted in Brazilian culture, its expression in the four host countries was facilitated by a 
particular pattern of economic and political relations. Thus while we might conceivably 
expect other Brazilian MNCs and perhaps also MNCs from other hierarchical market 
economies to adopt an assertive or forceful style of management, and perhaps that it, too, 
might be combined with US-derived ‘best practice’, the extent to which this might be realized 
in a fashion close to that found here is likely to be contingent on the ‘strength’ of the 
particular MNC in the market place and in the host economy. To the degree that other 
emerging country or hierarchical market economy MNCs are able to have their way in 
diffusing their version of ‘best practice’, the question then arises as to what extent will they 
come to act as benchmarks for efficiency for other firms within their sector? We have not 
been able to ask this question in our research, but it is of obvious importance to the themes 
explored here.  
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Appendix 1 
Primary Data Sources 
 
List of in-depth interviewees 
Country in which 
interviewed 
Language of 
interview 
Tape 
Recorded 
Global HR director (a) Brazil Portuguese yes 
Global HR director (b) Brazil Portuguese yes 
Recruiting manager (a) Brazil Portuguese yes 
Recruiting manager (b) Brazil Portuguese yes 
Sourcing senior manager Brazil Portuguese yes 
Global training manager Brazil Portuguese yes 
Training manager Brazil Portuguese yes 
Compensation senior manager Brazil Portuguese yes 
Global HR senior manager* Switzerland Portuguese yes 
Corporate affairs senior manager* Switzerland Portuguese yes 
HR senior manager Switzerland English yes 
HR manager Switzerland English yes 
Rewards senior manager* Switzerland Portuguese no 
Financial manager Switzerland English yes 
Commercial manager Switzerland English yes 
Corporate affairs manager Switzerland English yes 
Global HR vice-president Brazil Portuguese yes 
Sourcing manager Brazil Portuguese yes 
Global HR director Brazil Portuguese yes 
Recruiting senior manager* Canada Portuguese yes 
Training manager Canada English yes 
Production Senior manager Canada English yes 
HR manager Canada English yes 
HR senior manager Canada English yes 
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HR director Canada English no 
Compensation manager Canada English yes 
Corporate affairs vice-president Canada English yes 
Financial senior manager* Canada Portuguese yes 
HR vice-president Canada English yes 
Corporate affairs senior manager Canada English yes 
Trade union director - USW Canada English yes 
HR senior manager Norway English yes 
Finance senior manager Norway English yes 
Trade union representative Norway English yes 
Production manager Norway English yes 
Site director Norway English yes 
Commercial manager Norway English yes 
Corporate affairs senior manager Norway English yes 
Trade union director - LO Norway English yes 
Trade union director - CUT Brazil Portuguese yes 
Trade union Director - Força Sindical Brazil Portuguese yes 
Trade union director -  UTG Brazil Portuguese yes 
Global HR manager Brazil Portuguese yes 
Former HR Global Director Brazil Portuguese no 
Site director UK English yes 
Production senior manager UK English yes 
Trade union representative UK English yes 
Corporate affairs senior manager UK English yes 
Financial senior manager UK English no 
HR senior manager UK English yes 
Corporate affairs manager UK English yes 
* Brazilian expatriates 
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Secondary Data Sources 
Sources  Title Country  Number of 
articles/videos 
Magazine Veja  Brazil 1,144 
Newspaper Folha de São Paulo Brazil 1,402 
Books Commemorative Books Brazil 5 
Annual reports Annual reports Brazil 70 
Newspaper Le Temps Switzerland 19 
Newspaper Tribune de Genève Switzerland 8 
Newspaper Toronto Star  Canada 1,140 
Newspaper The Sudbury Star Canada 500 
Magazine Northern Life  Canada 9 videos 
Web site Norwegian Confederation of Trade 
union 
Norway 10 
Web site Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise Norway 2 
Web site Official Norwegian Reports Norway  2 
Newspaper Western Mail’s UK 67 
Newspaper South Wales Evening Post UK 88 
Internal 
Communications 
Emails, collective agreements, 
procedures to be followed, policies, 
internal presentations 
Brazil, 
Switzerland, 
Canada and the UK 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
